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Abstract 
 
Democracy is usually conceived, within both public discourse and political 
debate, not only as a form of government but also as a positive value that 
deserves to be universally pursued. However, many criticisms to democratic 
models have contributed to question this assumption, calling into question a 
superficial notion of the term. Indeed, a lack of political awareness and social 
reflection in public opinion is evidently responsible for disruptive failures in 
advanced models of democracy, opening the way to populisms. Significantly, 
these inner pitfalls of democracy were patently evident to Ortega y Gasset 
who, from the end of 1920s, questioned the ways through which intellectuals 
could effectively contribute to forge opinions and habits of individuals and 
communities. To lead the beleaguered mayhem caused by an exceptional form 
of hyper-democracy, he unceasingly strove to define an original intellectual 
commitment to mass education. This paper offers a critical analysis in 
historical context of Ortega y Gasset’s political and educational project to 
reform humanities and promote an aware political participation.  
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Resumen 
La democracia, tanto en el discurso público como en el debate político, se concibe 
frecuentemente no sólo como una forma de gobierno, sino también como un valor 
positivo que merece ser universalmente perseguido. Sin embargo, muchas críticas 
a los modelos de democracia han contribuido a cuestionar esta postura, poniendo 
en duda la validez de este concepto, tachándolo de superficial. De hecho, la 
ausencia de conciencia y reflexión política en la opinión pública determinan el 
posible fracaso de modelos avanzados de democracia, abriendo el camino a 
distintas formas de populismo. Ya desde finales de la década de los ’20 Ortega y 
Gasset subrayó la relevancia de algunos problemas y desafíos constitutivos de la 
democracia, preguntándose cómo los intelectuales podían contribuir de forma 
eficaz a forjar las opiniones y las costumbres de individuos y comunidades. Para 
gobernar el desorden caótico, causado por el dominio de la hiperdemocracia, 
Ortega propuso una nueva concepción del compromiso intelectual dirigido hacia 
la educación de masa. Este artículo ofrece un análisis crítico, en el contexto 
histórico, del proyecto político y educativo de Ortega y Gasset. Un proyecto 
finalizado a reformar las humanidades y fomentar una participación política 
responsable. 
Palabras clave: Ortega y Gasset, historia intelectual, educación, filosofía, 
comunidad política  
274   Scotton – Ortega y Gasset’s Social Education 
 
 
 
One needs to decide between these two incompatible tasks: either one 
comes to the world to do politics, or one comes to make definitions. The 
definition is the clear idea, rigorous, without contradictions, whereas 
the acts that it implies are confused, impossible, contradictory (Ortega 
y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 206)1.  
 
There are two kinds of men: the busy and the worried, politicians and 
intellectuals. The act of thinking implies the fact of taking care before 
dealing with something, it means to be worried about things, it means 
to interposing ideas between the desire and the execution. An extreme 
worry leads to apraxia, which is a disease. Indeed, the intellectual is 
almost always a little sick (Ortega, y Gasset 2010, v. 4, p. 210-211)2. 
 
 
y considering these words that Ortega wrote in 1927 in his essay on 
the French politician Comte de Mirabeau it could seem paradoxical 
to trying to conceive his own intellectual meditation as intrinsically 
linked to a political activity. Indeed, in this text, he traced a radical distinction 
between men of practical and theoretical mindsets, and he did so in a way that 
appears to render incompatible the two spheres. However, the study of the 
authentic reasons and motivations laying behind this thesis can help us 
understanding their extremely contingent and political intentions, contributing 
to elucidate the intrinsically political character of the entire Ortega’s 
philosophical activity. Indeed, in this specific case, at least two reasons 
sustained such a radical statement.  
On the one hand, Ortega traced this radical contraposition as a self-
justification for having recently stepped back, in 1926, from his prolific and 
long-lasting activity as a political commentator in several liberal newspapers, 
such as El Sol. A decision that he took after the exacerbation of the censorship 
exercised by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera (Fonck, 2010). On 
the other hand, he instrumentally used the thesis about the constitutive lack of 
normative reasoning of politicians as a via negationis argument to prove the 
necessity of giving to the intellectuals a proper space in the Spanish political 
life.  
Philosophers, Ortega argues, are often expelled from the political scenario, 
but this does not mean that a critical aptitude should not be adopted in politics. 
B 
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In fact: “Time by time society becomes more complicated, and politicians 
increasingly need to be more like intellectuals” (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, 
p. 222)3. Consequently, he strongly criticized the common misconception of 
the successful politician conceived as a charismatic and authoritative man of 
deeds. According to him, if such authoritarianism were not combined with the 
ability to persuade the masses by rationally defending the legitimacy of a 
given form of government, all politicians would have experienced a very 
fragile and short-lasting political leadership.  
Consequently, the thesis purported by the Spanish philosopher, rather than 
constituting a proof of his abandonment of political activity, is indeed a 
representation of his proactive attempt to gather new consensus in his 
intellectual circles, with the aim of promoting the organization of an 
intellectual dissent against the dictatorship. Thus, even such an apparently 
harsh defense of the neutral, abstract and universal character of philosophy 
purported by Ortega ultimately appears to be motivated by political intentions.  
This is just an instance of a more general trait that undoubtedly characterizes 
Ortega’s works, and that Cerezo Galán perspicaciously resumed affirming that 
Ortega’s philosophy is always a practical reason, and, as such, is polarized 
towards the sociopolitical sphere (Cerezo Galán, 2011, p. 34).  It seems even 
possible to go a step further, stating that politics served to Ortega as a valuable 
object of philosophical reflection, up to the point that it determined his 
intellectual agenda throughout his whole life.  
This article aims to demonstrate the validity of this statement by focusing 
on some specific cases. Accordingly, the next pages will exhibit the inner 
connection between these two sides of Ortega’s thought through the study of 
the role he assigned to humanistic education in society. It does so by adopting 
a rigorous textual analysis connected to the historical context, by studying 
Ortega’s utterance in relation to the socio-cultural conditions in which he 
lived, according to the methodology of intellectual history (Richter, 1995; 
Skinner, 2002). In fact, by considering his role as a philosopher and a public 
intellectual through a not exclusively theoretical perspective but also a 
historical and sociological one (Angermuller, 2013; Collins, 1979 and 1998), 
it is possible to affirm that Ortega’s life, thought and circumstance constitute 
an indivisible unity. Therefore, the article adopts a multilevel analysis that 
considers the philosophical discourse in its synchronic and diachronic 
dimension, with a particular emphasis on its formal construction and 
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transmission. In other words, the different philosophical ideas purported by 
Ortega concerning the educative process will be theoretically and historically 
scrutinized in relation to the Spanish political and social history. 
Consequently, the purpose of this article is threefold: firstly, it aims to 
prove that throughout his entire life Ortega always tried to convert a recurrent 
idea in a political practice: i.e. the thesis according to which the health of a 
political community depends on the degree of education of its citizens. 
Secondly, the article will demonstrate that from this idea Ortega developed a 
comprehensive theory about the political role of intellectuals – conceived as 
groups rather than individuals – as active creators of social consensus and 
political legitimacy. Finally, it argues that contrary to a widespread elitist 
interpretation of Ortega’s thought, his contribution on the importance of an 
enlightened form of education does represent a profoundly inter-class and 
democratic project. A project that can also give us the opportunity of reflecting 
about the limits and possible improvements of our view about the nature of 
democratic practices.  
 
 
A Philosopher in the Political Arena 
 
Teaching and communicating his ideas to a vast audience constituted the main 
goal of Ortega y Gasset from his very youth, at least since he was a student at 
the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Madrid (Tabernero del Río, 
1993). His very biography is that of a predestined cultural leader. Indeed, 
thanks to the personal relationships of his family – that belonged to a long 
tradition of liberal politicians (Valero Lumbreras, 2013) – Ortega’s life had 
soon be characterized by a regular attendance to the most educated social 
milieu of the Spanish capital (Zamora Bonilla, 2002). Thus, the consistent 
social capital he inherited from his family gave him the opportunity to gain a 
relevant notoriety within the Madrilenian bourgeoisie, in particular thanks to 
his journalistic activity in the family’s newspaper, El Imparcial (Blanco 
Alonso, 2005). Very likely, the political career should have appeared to 
Ortega as the natural path to follow in a country characterized by a reduced 
social mobility and a quite restricted oligarchy (Fradera, & Millan, 2000; 
Moral Roncal, 2003). However, without discarding the possibility of 
HSE – Social and Education History, 8(3) 277 
 
 
intervening in politics, he chose another path, preferring to follow his personal 
vocation by studying philosophy.  
As a student in Madrid, he took advantage of the first occasion that was 
offered to him – a scholarship funded by the Junta para la Ampliación de 
Estudios (JAE) – and decided to ameliorate his philosophical knowledge in 
Germany. In Marburg, he discovered an academic reality that surprised and 
shocked him, being very different from the one he was accustomed to in Spain. 
From then on, Germany represented to him a model to emulate, a cultural ideal 
that he and his country should have to pursue. Thus, at the age of 23, Ortega 
expressed the certainty of having a proper mission to accomplish, a personal 
life project: enhance the social conditions of the Spanish society not by acting 
as a politician, but rather through an educative activity (Garcia Nuño, 2014). 
This personal goal is clearly expressed in an interesting series of articles he 
anonymously wrote for El Imparcial in 1906, signed with the initials X.Z. The 
series is significantly entitled La Universidad española y la Universidad 
Alemana. This brief comparative study reveals the presence of what he called 
a fix idea, an oppressive mania: “The reform of the concept common people 
generally have of culture” (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 1, p. 133)4. Accordingly, 
as he wrote in El imparcial when defining Politics he affirmed that: 
 
Politics means an action on the indeterminate will of people, not on their 
muscles; that is to say an education, not an imposition. It does not mean 
giving laws, but giving ideals. And by saying ideals I do not mean 
anything vague and womanly, but any possible spiritual or material 
improvement (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, vol 1, p. 135) 5. 
 
Indeed, during his youth Ortega was persuaded that politics had mainly to 
be concerned with the construction of myths and ideals, and with the ability 
of politicians to persuade people to pursue them. Therefore, his pedagogical 
commitment implied a constant effort towards the implementation of an 
effective social education in Spain (Elorza, 2002)6. For this reason, he soon 
enrolled in the Spanish Fabian Society (Abellán, 2005), created in 1907. He 
endorsed a liberal pedagogical ideal that focused on the development of 
individuals – and in particular, of those who were better equipped with 
intellectual and material resources – in order to favor a general improvement 
of the social conditions through this minority influence. 
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Consequently, in a country characterized by a very poor educative level in 
comparison to the other European nations (Nuñez, 2005; Scotton, 2014), the 
primary goal Ortega wanted to accomplish consisted in promoting a reform of 
the educative system. Indeed, in the same year in which he began his academic 
career as a professor of Metaphysics, in 1910, he pronounced a very relevant 
conference that marked his entire following career: La pedagogía social como 
programa político. In that occasion, he vindicated the importance of 
reforming an old and conservative educative arrangement by promoting a laic, 
liberal and socialist reform of education.  
This was just the first of a long series of public discourses in which Ortega 
directly intervened in the Spanish political debate, breaking the line between 
academia and politics. Another very significant instance is represented by the 
very famous conference, in 1914, which marked the establishment of the Liga 
de educación política. In this case, he formally acted as the spokesperson of a 
political association, of an entire generation of young intellectuals and 
members of a growing bourgeoisie who wanted to regenerate the Spanish 
society: the famous Generación del ’14 (Costa Delgado, 2015; 2019). To 
counter the pernicious practice of caciquismo (González Hernández, 1999; 
Villacañas, 2014) Ortega assigned to the University, conceived as a laboratory 
of intellectual thinking, a leading role in determining the ends that political 
leaders should have to realize.  
Around the pivotal figure of Ortega started to orbit an entire generation 
that, more than a common philosophical view, did share similar opinions 
concerning the political tools to be adopted to promote a social, cultural and 
economic improvement. Therefore, when Ortega wrote his manifesto for the 
Liga de educación política, he was legitimizing a political intervention via an 
educative reform: “For us the first thing is to promote the education of a 
minority in charge of the political education of the masses” (Ortega y Gasset, 
2010, v. 1, p. 739)7. Evidently, at that time, what rendered Ortega’s philosophy 
appealing was not the content of his original theoretical meditation, but rather 
his ability to be a reference point for an entire generation. Back to his very 
youth, his political thought can easily be interpreted as a “polyphonic practice 
of positioning” (Angermuller, 2013, p. 296) both in the academia and in 
politics. 
Such political education of the masses coincided with his attempt of 
forming a new leading class, opened to the European cultural innovations. 
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Accordingly, the creation of the Revista de Occidente in 1923 constituted 
another proof of this continuous effort of forming a new intellectual minority 
able to change the political scenario.  
After this long and very fruitful project, it is necessary to skip to the end 
of the 1920s before encountering in the biography of Ortega y Gasset another 
direct intervention in the political life of his country. Indeed, Ortega perceived 
the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and the hegemonic role played by 
traditionalist thinkers such as Ramiro de Maeztu a substantial failure of his 
educative proposal, and a victory of the authoritative dogmatism (Villacañas, 
2000). This state of affairs led Ortega to experience a profound dissatisfaction 
towards politics. However, when politics invaded the academic niche in which 
he sheltered, in particular on the famous closing of the University of Madrid 
in 1929, he manifested all his disappointment for the violent and oppressive 
regime that was leading the country, resigning from his role as professor. He 
criticized the students’ drift towards violence and the extreme politicization 
of the University of Madrid, interpreting them as symptoms of the spreading 
of populism within the academia: “During several years, I have had to find a 
place outside the university building due to the frequent screams of the 
students, parked in the corridors, that made impossible to understand each 
other in the classroom” (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 1039)8. 
When, 9 October 1930, the University re-opened, Ortega’s popularity was 
at its best, in particular thanks to the publication of the Rebelión de las Masas. 
Some students belonging to the FUE (Fundación Universitaria Escolar) 
invited him to give a conference on the most urgent topic at stake: the future 
of the University after the end of the dictatorship. The recent dramatic events 
called for a meditation on the social role of this institution, its scope and aims. 
Ortega accepted the invitation. Not only he gave this conference, but he also 
published his reflections on El Sol and, soon after, he published these articles 
as a book entitled La Misión de la Universidad. This threefold circulation of 
his theses makes patent the will of the philosopher to target the public opinion 
through all the possible channels offered to him (Blanco Alonso, 2005). He 
conceived his role as similar to that of an enlightened philosopher who wanted 
to contribute to forge a critical public opinion.  
Indeed, such a critical public opinion, according to Ortega, was completely 
and dramatically absent in Europe during the 1930s. In particular because of 
two main reasons. The first was the new scientific discoveries that had 
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contributed to alter both the specialized and the common vision of the word; 
the second was that scientists and intellectuals had renounced to offer a new 
overall understanding of these discoveries to a large audience, to put them in 
a broader a meaningful picture. Consequently, in order to build a modern 
public opinion it would have been indispensable to promote a reformed 
program of education and civilization among the population. This would 
constitute a long time process that would have involved both a cultural and a 
political education of the masses to reassure the validity of social institutions. 
In particular by exhibiting the historical reasons that brought to their creation 
and maintenance over time (Sánchez Cámara, 2003).  
In this context, the Misión de la Universidad not only constituted a 
philosophical and pedagogical text, but also a political one. Indeed, in its 
introduction Ortega presented himself as a spiritual guide for his students, as 
a heir of the tradition of pedagogical renewal started by the Institución Libre 
de Enseñanza (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 1034-1035). The University 
reform was considered as a priority to counter what he interpreted as the 
supremacy of an undisciplined mass that had entered this educative institution, 
after having obtained a more significant role in society. His students were part 
of these masses; they were no longer an elite as before. However, this 
diagnosis offered by Ortega is not as pessimist as it appears. Indeed, whereas 
Rebelión de las masas constitutes the pars destruens of Ortega vision of 
democracy, Misión de la Universidad is its pars construens.  
Interestingly enough, since his audience was paradigmatically changing 
and the masses had entered the university, Ortega had to critically  reconceive 
his own social and academic role as a leading philosopher, in order to maintain 
his social status. This is a clear demonstration of the impossibility of reducing 
any philosophical theory to a mere theoretical standpoint or interchange of 
ideas, being philosophy always related, on the contrary, to practical and 
political situations, intentions and ends that enliven a given society in a 
specific time (Skinner, 2002). 
In particular, for restoring an authentic democratic practice Ortega 
considered as indispensable to reverse the process of depersonalization that 
was taking place both within and outside the academia: “To act on a mass you 
have to stop being one, you have to be a living force; you have to be a group 
in shape” (Ortega, 2004-2010, IV, p. 1040)9 . Accordingly, the educative 
reform proposed by Ortega dealt with the social category of the mass-man, 
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the hombre masa. With this term he indicated a mediocre person whose 
cognitive abilities, character and desires revealed an uneducated person who, 
in his everyday life, simply conforms to the rest of the population without 
thinking autonomously: 
 
It is possible that never the average person has been so far below his 
own time, below what it demands to him. For this reason, shady, 
fraudulent actions have never been so abundant. Almost no one is 
responding to his true and authentic destiny. The average man lives by 
subterfuges with which he lies to himself, pretending to live in a very 
simple and arbitrary world, despite the fact that the vital conscience 
makes him scream that his true world, which corresponds to his full 
essence, is enormously complex, precise and demanding (Ortega y 
Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 559)10. 
 
The rebelled masses did represent an inescapable reality of the new society, 
but this phenomenon should not be simply accepted, but rather managed and 
countered by a pedagogical activity. This meant that the University should 
have to assume such responsibility, being open to a larger audience in 
comparison to the past. Since the mass-men and the low social classes had 
been conquering an increasing relevance within the political life, Ortega 
considered that the University would have undergone the same destiny: 
becoming a mass institution. In order to avoid that this process underpinned 
the cultural leading role, played by the University, it was necessary to change 
its functioning and goals, which had proved to cause more harms than 
benefits. Indeed, the University should have become a promoter principle for 
the European history (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 568) by constructing a 
barrier against the hyper-democratic and irrational character of the mass-men. 
This goal would have been rendered possible only through the construction of 
a comprehensive understanding of the new scientific and social world, and by 
the following transmission of a systematic culture – conceived as “a system 
of vital ideas possessed by each historical epoch” (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 
4, p. 568) – to the whole population. To do this, given the low level of the 
students – i.e. of the mass man – it would have been necessary to introduce a 
new basic pedagogical principle; i.e. the principle of economy:  
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It is necessary to start from the average student. Then it is necessary to 
consider as the kernel of the entire university institution, as its pivotal 
point or primary figure, exclusively that body of teachings that can be 
rigorously demanded, or, in other words, only those teachings that a 
good average student can really learn (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 
549)11. 
 
The University had to guarantee a basic understanding of the main 
scientific questions, so to offer to everyone the minimum background 
indispensable for taking an active and meaningful part in the public debate. 
For this reason, teachings should focus exclusively on general notions that all 
and each person could have understood and from which everyone could have 
significantly benefited: 
 
It is necessary to reconstruct with the scattered pieces - disierta membra 
- the vital unity of the European average man. It is necessary that each 
individual or - avoiding utopianisms - many individuals, become, each 
one in his individuality, the whole man. Who can do this but the 
University? (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 542)12. 
 
The worry showed by Ortega was based on the persuasion that the masses 
were going to play a progressively important role in the political sphere. For 
this reason, it would have been indispensable to promote a new model of mass 
education. In fact, the public opinion of an authentic democracy could not 
have been just the expression of unthinking wills and instinctual reactions, of 
what Ortega called the “reason of unreason” (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 
419). On the contrary, it had to possess a rational and critical view on social 
issues in order to guarantee a real political participation (Peris Suay, 2009). 
Ortega’s aim was avoiding the proliferation of hyper-democracy, which is the 
situation in which all opinions, even the dumbest, count equally (Ariso, 2013). 
For these reasons, he advocated for a critical education whose main goal was 
that of constructing a reflexive public opinion.  
With the end of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship new political forces 
appeared on the horizon and new political projects were planned. In that 
context, Ortega immediately brought his educative theories to politics. He did 
so, in particular, in the occasion of the political campaign of 1930, in the 
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theatre of the city of León, when sustaining the recently born Agrupación a 
Servicio de la República:  
 
I tell you this: the most difficult idea of the world, when thought by a 
man with full clarity, can be exposed so that it can be understood by the 
most humble understanding and by the least cultured soul. (...) Since 
democracy is something that is done with the people, all true democracy 
is, at the end, education and teaching for the people (Ortega y Gasset, 
2010, v. 8, p. 489-490)13. 
 
The possibility of creating a republican government acquired a 
progressively larger number of supporters. On the 10th of February 1931 the 
manifesto of this new political association was published in El Sol. 
Significantly, before its publishing, the Manifesto had already circulated 
within the University of Madrid (Márquez Padorno, 2003). In this text, Ortega 
justified his role as an active politician by saying that the urgency of the 
political situation had rendered indispensable for all to leave their professions 
and serve the public good (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 660). Ortega 
definitely passed the border between politics and academia, being persuaded 
that it would have been necessary to realize the political reforms he always 
envisaged, and to construct: “A Republic that wakes up in all the Spaniards 
both dynamism and discipline, calling them to resuscitate the history of Spain 
(...) demanding a lot from each citizen” (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 4, p. 661)14. 
Evidently enough, in his critiques to democracy Ortega did not exhibit any 
elitism. On the contrary, he strenuously defended a project of political reform 
with the aim of building a critical and rational public opinion.  
This is true also in relation to the evolution of his thought and public 
activities during the last part of his life, a period that many critics have directly 
associated to a silent (Elorza, 2002) or even overt endorsement (Morán, 1998) 
to Franco’s regime15. Indeed, with the victory of the far-rights movements, 
after the civil war Ortega decided to reduce his public utterances regarding 
political topics, preferring to observe a performative silence16. A silence that 
has recently been interpreted as a partial and indirect critique to the 
dictatorship, or as an attempt to open a dialogue between opposing fronts 
(Giustiniani, 2007b; Martín, 2014). However, his limited intervention cannot 
be understood without taking into account the sociological and historical 
conditions under which he lived, and that always constitute paramount 
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features of any philosophical activity practiced within an institutionalized 
framework (Angermuller, 2013). Indeed, Ortega was progressively losing 
both a receptive audience and the connection to the social institution to which 
he pertained. Consequently, even though he remained a leading member of an 
international scientific community, he was losing his social position, 
accordingly reducing his symbolic status. 
In any case, Ortega’s scholars have been paying no attention so far to the 
evolution of his pedagogical thought during the ‘30s, even if, as proved, it 
constitutes a litmus test for understanding his political standpoint. 
Significantly, not only he never denied the theses he pronounced in his 
discourse in León, but also he directly criticized the pedagogical policies of 
those governments that produced a mentality that debases the masses (Ortega 
y Gasset, 2010, v. 5, p. 285). 
In this context, the critique to the scholastic pedagogy that Ortega 
developed during the 1940s in La idea de principio en Leibniz, or his book on 
Vives, can be said to constitute clear instances of a direct opposition to the 
new scholasticism implemented by the regime in the University of Madrid 
(Conderrana Cerrillo, 2013; Scotton, 2017). The most patent defense of a 
democratizing education in the last period of Ortega’s life can be found in the 
creation of what has been defined as a challenge to the Franco regime 
(Abellán, 2006): the Instituto de Humanidades Ortega funded together with 
Julián Marías in 1948, when he went back to Madrid from his Lusitanian exile.  
Various members of Franco’s regime perceived such Institute as a serious 
risk for the stability of the dictatorship, in particular since it could have 
questioned the legitimacy of the new intellectual and political elite. This is 
proven, for instance, by the worries expressed by the director of the recently 
funded review of the CSIC, Arbor, Pérez Embid, to the traditionalist thinker 
Calvo Serer, regarding the fact that Ortega was acquiring a growing 
popularity, in particular within the youngest generation of students: 
 
Meanwhile Ortega, Marías, García Gómez, Sambricio and others 
have opened Aula Nueva, a sort of independent Faculty of Philosophy 
with classes and monographic courses to which all the students of the 
Faculty have enrolled. All the young graduates go there as desperate 
souls (as cited in Díaz Hernández, 2008, p. 171)17. 
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Indeed, through the Institute Ortega was trying to actively taking part in 
the cultural and political Spanish life. His main aim was playing a leading role 
as an independent scholar and not as an organic intellectual of the regime. For 
this reason, he refused all public endorsement to his project, and chose not to 
give his lessons in the University. For the same reason, he also decided to 
refuse the financial help that the Rockefeller Foundation had offered him, 
counting exclusively on the matriculation fees of the Institute’s students. In 
this way, he accepted the difficult task of building a new educative institute 
with a complete different scope and purpose in respect to the official 
academia. His project was that of constructing in Madrid an oasis for the 
practicing of philosophy. A clearly utopian ideal that sprang from his desire 
of realizing what he always considered as his intellectual mission.  
In the prospectus of the Institute, Ortega particularly focused on the meaning 
of humanities in historical and sociological perspective. The premise that 
opens this short pamphlet reveals at least two important and apparently 
opposed features of Ortega’s last project: a) the global scope of his theoretical 
analysis, not limited to the Spanish scenario but opened to a constant 
confrontation with different philosophical traditions and disciplinary 
perspectives; b) the intention to delve into the concrete living conditions of 
the post-war society, and of doing this by focusing specifically on the Spanish 
case.  
Regarding the first aspect, in line with his previous meditations (Monfort 
Prades, 2010), Ortega pointed out the necessity of defining humanities as an 
interdisciplinary set of knowledge that, under a unifying philosophical 
concept, would have to include different approaches such as that provided by 
linguistic, philology, ethnology, historiography – as Ortega called it, 
historiology – and economy. Accordingly, the Institute should have been 
conceived as a collaborative project in which the activities of different 
scholars and, hopefully, students, would have been aimed at analyzing 
relevant problems, thus contributing to shed light on a complex and 
fragmented reality. The prospectus was indeed an “essay on interdisciplinary” 
(Graham, 2001, p. 426), both regarding its principles and its subsequent 
practice. As Ortega put it: 
 
If we want the disciplines of Humanities to regain their true vigor it is 
necessary to struggle for the reintegration of culture in its entirety, 
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trying to limit, through all possible means, its specialist dispersion that 
is, on the other hand, inevitable (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 9, p. 1179)18.  
 
Regarding the second feature, it is possible to notice in these texts recurrent 
references to the Spanish cultural scenario. Not only Ortega frequently 
criticized the scholastic tradition, but also, and foremost, he direct invited the 
Spanish population to collaborate in his new project. In the dumb cultural 
atmosphere of Franco’s Spain Ortega was aware of the political prudence he 
had to observe to avoid any repression. For this reason, on a one hand he 
vindicated the aristocratic character of his intellectual project, but on the other 
he overtly called for the widespread stimulus of this project in the civil society. 
In summary, the Instituto de Humanidades constituted Ortega’s response to 
the main troubles concerning the new role of the intellectuals, the academia 
and the philosopher under Franco’s regime. By 1948, Ortega dealt with new 
radical problems, concerning both the cultural situation of his country – 
substantially deprived of a real freedom of speech and democratic 
participation – and the global situation in which the intellectuals were trying 
to regain a meaningful role after the drama of the WWII. Even in this tragic 
period, Ortega affirmed the necessity for the intellectuals of continuing to 
foster a reflexive and critical attitude among the population. Therefore, also 
in the last part of his life, traditionally conceived by many interpreters as a 
turning point towards more conservative positions and towards the rejection 
of a democratic outlook (González Cueva, 2006 and 2009; Achiri, 2012), 
Ortega resembles to a radical thinker that critically counters the social reality 
with the aim of profoundly changing and democratizing it.  Not to an 
embittered aristocrat. 
Consequently, it is possible to affirm that the Instituto de Humanidades 
paradigmatically reveals the constant attention paid by Ortega to the 
importance of educating citizens to live a democratic life. A constant idea that 
he never denied, even when he changed his methods and languages in relation 
to changing political circumstances.  
 
Humanities and Political Engagement: Ortega’s Concept of Democracy 
 
The diachronic evolution of Ortega’s pedagogical thought demonstrates that 
his ideal of humanist education has always been linked, during all his life, to 
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a direct political intervention aimed to forge a critical public opinion. This was 
because he attributed to philosophers and intellectuals, conceived as groups 
of active political agents, a prominent role in determining the norms and aims 
of a given society. This fundamental idea was based in particular on two basic 
assumptions.  
Firstly, Ortega's political thinking stemmed from the premise according to 
which the increasing importance of the masses in the political life determined 
the need, de facto rather than de jure, of rethinking the very nature of 
democratic representation. Indeed, representative democracy was, according 
to Ortega, anachronistic, since it rested on principles that were no longer 
commonly accepted by the population. We can call this first premise as the 
rebellion premise. Furthermore, Ortega’s study of the characters of the mass-
men and his insistence on the necessity of promoting a new humanistic 
education for converting the average human beings in authentic human 
beings, unmasked a second premise of his reasoning. I.e.: the optimistic 
assumption according to which people, when addressed as individuals, can be 
prepared to live a meaningful and not hetero-directed political life. We can 
label this second premise as the reforming premise. This second features of 
Ortega’s thought clearly counters the pessimist views that was common 
among sociologists and philosophers during the same period (Riesman, 
Glazer, & Denney, 1950).  
Indeed, by focusing specifically on the second part of Ortega’s life it is 
possible to highlight the existence of a sociological reflection that clearly 
follows the pedagogical concerns he exhibited during this same period. As 
already proven, from the end of the II Republic Ortega was perfectly aware of 
the fact that intellectuals, in Spain, had been relegated to a marginal position, 
in particular in comparison to the previous Edad de Plata. Under a new 
authoritarian regime, being an intellectual was synonymous of being a 
communist, a Freemason, an atheist and ultimately an immoral person. In that 
context, there was no longer any space for an intellectual intervention that was 
not directly ruled by the instituted power. Accordingly, Ortega started to 
question what to be an intellectual was meant to be: if philosophy is conceived 
as a form of intellectual parrhesia, that is the effort of understanding, claiming 
and defending the truth reached via a deliberative process, how would 
philosophy accomplish this social and political mission? In addition, what 
happens if philosophy is put under oppressing conditions? Ortega answered 
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to these questions in particular in the two courses he gave at the Instituto de 
Humanidades: Del Imperio Romano and El hombre y la gente.  
As previously demonstrated, in Ortega’s writings it is possible to notice 
that the masses do possess the germs to become active and conscious citizens. 
This is because society is regulated by some basic norms, that Ortega calls 
usos, defining them as "fossilized ideas". These consist in a set of concepts, 
actions, and behaviors that are executed apparently unconsciously by people 
in society, producing the distorted effects of mass democracy that he 
denounced in his famous La Rebelión de las masas. Consequently, in this 
coexistence of other-directed life and autonomous life it would be possible to 
notice an apparent paradox, which however constitutes the theoretical premise 
of Ortega’s reforming will: 
 
We just said that human life, a radical reality, had two forms: the 
authentic one, which is the personal life, and the pseudo-form of it, 
which is the collective life. This is the only thing that sociology does 
study. But this collective life - today we have discovered it completely 
- flows and springs from the authentic personal life. And this is, in short, 
what you have to study: this personal life, this human life is history 
(Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 9, p. 361)19. 
 
Hence, according to Ortega, there still is a place for those intellectuals who 
had apparently lost their ability to influence the public opinion: they should 
dedicate themselves to comprehend and communicate to the population at 
large the reasons sustaining the historical development of society, with the 
goal of promoting a better and critical understanding of the present. Thus, 
Ortega strengthened the connection between education and politics, by 
affirming that the political role of intellectuals would consist in a continuous 
teaching and learning process directed to the individuals who compose the 
mass. Accordingly, he criticized any form of intellectualism and 
propagandistic politics, as the one purported by the regime (Ortega y Gasset, 
2010, v. 5, p. 544). 
In fact, when Ortega wrote his essay on the Roman Empire this was a very 
popular topic among the new organic intellectuals of Franco’s regime. In such 
a context, he provocatively entered in the Spanish intellectual debate by 
radically changing the general standpoint. The crisis of the social and political 
life of the Roman Empire would reveal, according to him, that no social reality 
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could be maintained into existence without the support of a basic condition of 
harmony among the members of that very society. That is to say, without a 
social consensus. However, this cannot be imposed violently. On the contrary, 
it has to be built and transmitted through an intellectual activity, not a mere 
propaganda, since all propagandistic actions do produce negative results, not 
taking into consideration the vital needs that ground the construction of the 
very set of beliefs shared by a society. As he put it, the national propaganda 
was only “the gas of passion, which gives souls a hot air illusion” (Ortega y 
Gasset, 2010, v. 6, p. 93).  
The responsibility of building this peculiar consensus was attributed by 
Ortega to the intellectuals, always conceived as a group of people acting 
together towards a common goal. In an unpublished note to El Hombre y la 
Gente conserved in his personal archive, it is possible to find a revealing 
commentary:  
 
All social reality is a use. But the use, before, was the invention of the 
individual and the cultivation of a group. If the performance of both the 
individual and the group is not rendered possible, hence society will die 
when the government dies (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 9, p. 361)20. 
 
Thus, also in the last years of his life, Ortega evidently defended the role 
of intellectuals and cultural minorities, conceived as responsible for the 
creation and maintenance into power of social uses. Governments are transient 
and their appeal is always temporary. On the contrary, the long-term 
legitimacy of a system of values is always the product of an intellectual 
influence rendered possible by the ability of single persons to be active 
receivers of this message.  
Thus, the apparently conservative character of Ortega's thought turns out 
to consist in a constant preoccupation in laying the necessary groundwork for 
the development of an authentic democracy, not ruled by the doxas, but 
characterized by an open and generalized critical reflection. If people were 
deprived of this peculiar civic education, then demagogic forms of populism 
would surely substitute democracy. In this scenario, Ortega conceives 
philosophers as "slaughterers", because of the cruelty with which they destroy 
widely accepted beliefs to turn them into meaningful knowledge. Indeed, 
citizens have to perceive themselves as a constitutive part of the society to 
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which they belong, participating to it according to their abilities, and being 
conscious of their limits. 
Intellectuals, according to Ortega, are therefore responsible for the 
development of the public opinion through a process of humanization of the 
demos, a mass that is assuming an increasingly important role in the political 
decision-making. Consequently, promoting an adequate education 
represented the task in which intellectuals have to be involved in a context in 
which the mass no longer recognized any legitimate form of authority. 
Accordingly, it is possible to affirm that the sociology developed by Ortega 
ultimately contributes to respond to a very urgent question: if we want that 
democracy does not become something that legitimizes its opposite, how can 
people be empowered so to be able to govern themselves? (Brown, 2010). 
Democracy is usually naively conceived as a positive value per se. 
However, as Ortega contributed to demonstrate, the term can assume very 
different connotation, and only when sustained by a critical civic education, 
directed towards all the people independently from their status, it can turn out 
to be a meaningful form of government. The videocracy (Sartori, 1997) of the 
1990s and the current upheaval of digital populism (Elmer, Langlois, & 
McKelvey, 2012; Neuman, 2016; Dal Lago, 2017) reveal how democracy is 
constitutively a fragile and demanding concept that has to be continuously 
implemented through meaningful practices.  
In conclusion, education did play a fundamental and constitutive role in 
relation to the development of Ortega’s philosophy throughout his all life, 
being always intrinsically linked to his political concerns. Indeed, he 
unceasingly argued that only a proper civic education would enable citizens 
to participate, not only actively but also consciously, in the political life of a 
society and in the democratic process of decision-making. Consequently, only 
this type of education would have been capable of subverting the main 
characteristics of the mass-people, that is, their lack of interest in listening to 
other points of view, their absence of critical reasoning, and inability to 
tolerate different opinions and ideas. This educative reform constituted, 
according to Ortega, the most urgent mission that philosophers and 
intellectuals had to accomplish. A mission that, to him, was always linked to 
an ethical ideal of authentic life, mirrored in the concept of humanistic 
education. According to his cultural ideal, Ortega conceived democracy as the 
best form of government for the active development of individual and social 
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capabilities, and he tried to put this ideal into practice even under oppressive 
conditions, by creating the Institute of Humanities. A project he realized 
always bearing in mind that: “all people should have the inexcusable duty of 
being intellectuals”. (Ortega y Gasset, 2010, v. 9, p. 1108).  
 
 
Notes 
1 All Ortega’s writings are quoted by referring to the last edition of his complete works. The 
author of the article provides the English translation of the text, while the original quotation 
appears as an endnote: “Hay que decidirse por una de estas dos tareas incompatibles: o se viene 
al mundo para hacer política, o se viene para hacer definiciones. La definición es la idea clara, 
estricta, sin contradicciones, pero los actos que impone son confusos, imposibles, 
contradictorios”.  
2 “Hay dos clases de hombres: los ocupados y los preocupados; políticos e intelectuales. Pensar 
es ocuparse antes de ocuparse, es preocuparse de las cosas, es interponer ideas entre el desear 
y el ejecutar. La preocupación extrema lleva a la apraxia, que es una enfermedad. El intelectual 
es, en efecto, casi siempre un poco enfermo”. 
3 “En el progreso de los tiempos la sociedad se complica y los políticos necesitan ser cada vez 
más intelectuales”. 
4 “La reforma del concepto que se tiene vulgarmente de cultura”. 
5 “La política significa una acción sobre la voluntad indeterminada del pueblo, no sobre sus 
músculos, una educación, no una imposición. No es dar leyes, es dar ideales y por ideales no 
se entiende nada vago y doncellil, sino cualquier posible mejora espiritual o material”. 
6  “Resulta imprescindible, para alcanzar la práctica trasformadora, pasar antes por la 
movilización de ese cuerpo mostrenco que comprende la mayoría de la población. De ahí que 
necesariamente democracia signifique pedagogía. (...) Es el problema en que se debate Ortega 
en sus diez primeros años, de optar por una labor pedagógica, siempre fundamental para él, 
pero sin incidencia concreta sobre un país en crisis de régimen” (Elorza, 2002, p. 43). 
7 “Para nosotros es lo primero fomentar la educación de una minoría encargada de la educación 
política de las masas”. 
8 “Desde hace años he tenido que buscar un sitio fuera del edificio universitario porque los 
gritos habituales de los señores estudiantes, estacionados en los pasillos, hacen imposible 
entenderse dentro de las aulas”. 
9 “Para actuar sobre una masa hay que dejar de serlo, hay que ser fuerza viva, hay que ser grupo 
en forma”. 
10 “Nunca tal vez el hombre medio ha estado tan por debajo de su propio tiempo, de lo que éste 
demanda. Por lo mismo, nunca han abundado tanto las existencias falsificadas, fraudulentas. 
Casi nadie está en su quicio en su auténtico destino. El hombre al uso vive de subterfugios con 
que se miente a sí mismo, fingiéndose entorno un mundo muy simple y arbitrario, a pesar de 
que la conciencia vital le hace constar a gritos que su verdadero mundo, el que corresponde a 
su plena actualidad, es enormemente complejo, preciso y exigente”. 
11 “Hay que partir del estudiante medio y considerar como núcleo de la institución universitaria, 
como sus tornos o figura primaria, exclusivamente aquel cuerpo de enseñanzas que se le pueden 
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en absoluto rigor exigir, o lo que es igual, aquellas enseñanzas que un buen estudiante medio 
puede de verdad aprender”. 
12 “Hay que reconstruir con los pedazos dispersos – disierta membra – la unidad vital del 
hombre europeo. Es preciso lograr que cada individuo o – evitando utopismos – muchos 
individuos lleguen a ser, cada uno por sí, entero ese hombre. ¿Quién puede hacer esto sino la 
Universidad?”. 
13 “Yo os digo lo siguiente: la idea más difícil del mundo cuando ha sido pensada por un hombre 
con plena claridad puede ser expuesta de manera que la entienda el entendimiento más humilde 
y el alma menos cultas. (…) Porque la política democrática es algo que se hace con el pueblo, 
más por lo mismo, toda verdadera política democrática es, a la vez, educación y enseñanza del 
pueblo”. 
14 “Una República que despierte en todos los españoles, a un tiempo, dinamismo y disciplina 
llamándolos a la soberana empresa de resucitar la historia de España (…) exigiendo mucho de 
cada ciudadano”. 
15 In particular, Giustiniani 2007a and 2014; and Lasaga Medina, 2012, have criticized these 
theses.  
16 On this performative and political function of silence, see Ferguson 2002, 8: “Silence can 
serve as resistance to any institution that requires verbal participation (as do virtually all). On 
a macroscopic political scale, states often require such participation and subsequently employ 
a variety of means to compel it. The state-sponsored requirement to take an oath is a particularly 
overt form of obligatory speech. Loyalty oaths, public recantations of heresy, self-
incrimination, enforced pledges of allegiance, and require judicial affirmations all oblige 
certain well-circumscribed speech acts”. 
17 “Mientras tanto Ortega, Marías, García Gómez, Sambricio y otros han abierto en Aula Nueva 
una especie de Facultad libre de Filosofía con una serie de clases y cursillos monográficos sobre 
los cuales se han volcado todos los estudiantes de la Facultad, y todos los Licenciados jóvenes 
que andan por ahí como alma en pena”. 
18 “Si se quiere que las disciplinas de Humanidades vuelvan a cobrar su auténtico vigor es 
preciso intentar la reintegración de la ciencia en su unidad, procurando compensar por todos 
los medios posibles su dispersión especialista que es, por otra parte, ineludible” 
19 “Dijimos en un momento que la vida humana, realidad radical, tenía dos formas: la auténtica, 
que es la vida personal, y la pseudoforma de ella, que es la vida colectiva. Esto solo estudia la 
sociología. Pero esta vida colectiva – hoy lo hemos averiguado con plenitud – mana y brota de 
la auténtica vida personal. Y esto es, en definitiva, lo que hay que estudiar: y esta vida personal, 
esta vida humana es historia”. 
20 “Toda realidad social es uso. Pero el uso tuvo antes que ser invención del individuo y cultivo 
de un grupo. Si se impide la actuación de estos la sociedad morirá cuando muera el gobierno”.  
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